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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has again decided a large number of cases concerning criminal law
and procedure. This survey will discuss only the more significant cases, and




In Untied States v. Sporleder,I probable cause for a warrant to search a
building was established in the supporting affidavit largely through the hear-
say statements of two informants. One informant tipped Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agents that he had delivered substantial quantities of phenyl-
2-proponone, an ingredient commonly used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine and amphetamine, to the subject location. The other in-
formant claimed that the defendant said he was manufacturing
methamphetamine in a fake radio shop at the location, and had previously
used a similar lab at a location where officers had seized paraphernalia fre-
quently used in methamphetamine labs.2 On appeal, the defendant chal-
lenged the validity of the search warrants.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that under Aguilar v. Texas, 3 an affidavit
supporting a search warrant must inform the magistrate "of some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the nar-
cotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circum-
stances from which the officer concluded that the informant .. . was
'credible' or his information 'reliable.' '4 In Sporleder, the affidavit clearly set
out underlying circumstances which verified the informant's conclusions
concerning the existence of narcotics on the premises. 5 The affidavit did not,
however, reveal the identity of the informants or whether they had previ-
ously proven reliable.
The appellate court held that a previous track record of reliability is not
necessary to satisfy Aguilar; an informant's trustworthiness may also be
proven through independent police investigation which corroborates the
1. 635 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1980).
2. Id at 811.
3. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
4. 635 F.2d at 811-12. In two cases decided during this survey period, United States v.
Pennington, 635 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Gagnon, 635 F.2d 766 (1981),
the Tenth Circuit implied that Agwiai' is of limited applicability in challenges of affidavit state-
ments supplied by nonprofessional informants who have little motivation for supplying false
information to police officers.
5. 635 F.2d at 812. The statements were based on conversations with the defendant and
personal observation of the premises.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
tip.6 In this case, the police placed a "beeper" in an order of methylamine,
the immediate precursor chemical used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine, and traced the delivery order to the subject location.
The court found this to be sufficient independent corroboration to satisfy the
second prong of the Agutlar test.
7
In United States v. Johnson,8 the defendant challenged the sufficiency of
an affidavit in support of an application for electronic surveillance on the
ground that the affidavit did not meet the necessary requirement of 18
U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c). This section of the statute provides that an application
for an order authorizing the interception of a wire communication shall in-
clude "a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."9 In this instance, the
affidavit outlined the investigative procedures that had been used, and
stated that the wiretap on the phone of the principal actor of a drug conspir-
acy was necessary to identify the other conspirators.
The Tenth Circuit, in noting that wiretap affidavits are to be read in a
practical rather than a hypertechnical manner, refused to interpret the sec-
tion to mean that the government must exhaust all other conceivable investi-
gative procedures before resorting to wiretapping. Rather, the affidavit need
only show that traditional procedures would be inadequate. Since appre-
hension of the "satellites" of an extensive drug conspiracy is a proper pur-
pose of electronic surveillance, the court held the affidavit to be sufficient in
this instance.' 0
In United States v. Schauble, t the Tenth Circuit considered the necessity
of a Franks hearing 12 in light of a challenge to the veracity of the factual
statements made in an affidavit in support of a search warrant. The affida-
vit stated that the informant, while at the subject residence, had seen a
quantity of green leafy vegetation believed to be marijuana. The defendant
requested a Franks hearing on the basis of his own affidavit stating that only
one person had visited the house during the stated time period. According
to the affidavit, this person had come no further than the front porch, from
where it is physically impossible to see inside the front door. The defendant
also offered in evidence another affidavit filled out by the same affiant, iden-
tical to the one in issue except for the language that the informant was "in-
side" the residence instead of "at" the residence.' 3
The court of appeals noted that Franks v. Delaware4 provides a chal-
lenge to a warrant's veracity only when the defendant makes a preliminary
6. 635 F.2d at 811-12. See Mapp v. Warden, N.Y. State Corr. Inst., 531 F.2d I167 (2d
Cir.), cert. deried, 429 U.S. 982 (1976),
7. 635 F.2d at 812.
8. 645 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1981).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
10. 645 F.2d at 867.
11. 647 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1981).
12. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), allows the defendant an evidentiary hearing
to challenge the factual allegations in a warrant affidavit in certain instances.
13. 647 F.2d at 117.
14. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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showing that the affiant knowingly or recklessly disregarded the truth in in-
cluding a false statement in the warrant affidavit. 15 In Schauble, the court
held that the defendant failed to make this preliminary showing, since the
defendant only produced facts showing that the informer's statement may
have been false, and not that the affiant knew or should have known it to be
false. That the affidavit stated that the informant was "at" the residence
was held not to sustain an inference that the affiant knew of the informant's
inability to see what the informant claimed to see. 16 The court concluded
that the Franks hearing was properly denied.
B. Investigatory Stop
In United States v. Merryman,' 7 the Tenth Circuit considered when an
officer on roving patrol may stop a car suspected of carrying illegal aliens
and what minimal intrusion upon the car's occupants may be justified by
this suspicion. In Menyman, the officer watched a truck pull over to the side
of the road just before it reached a United States border patrol checkpoint,
wait until a string of cars passed, and then make a U-turn across the median
and go back in the opposite direction. The officer followed the truck and
observed that it was a type frequently used to transport illegal aliens, and
that beneath the tarp covering the bed of the truck were lumpy objects.' 8
The officer approached the truck when it stopped at a gas station and ques-
tioned the driver about his citizenship and the contents in the bed of the
truck. The officer then stuck his head in the back of the truck "in prepara-
tion for reaching down and telling them to come out from under there.' 9
The officer smelled what he believed to be marijuana, and saw something
similar to hay sticking from under the tarp; the truck contained 242 pounds
of marijuana.
The Tenth Circuit relied upon United States v. Brignoni-Ponce2 ° in refus-
ing to suppress the marijuana as evidence discovered through an illegal
search. Brignoni-Ponce held that probable cause is not needed for an investi-
gatory stop of a car suspected of carrying illegal aliens; such a stop may be
justified by specific articulable facts together with rational inferences from
the facts which warrant suspicion that the car contained illegal aliens. 2 I By
looking at the total circumstances, the appellate court was satisfied that the
stop in Merryman met the Br'gnoni-Ponce test. The court distinguished United
States v. Oglvie ,22 which held that avoiding a checkpoint by exiting the high-
15. Id
16. Id
17. 630 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1980).
18. Id at 781.
19. Id
20. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
21. Id
22. 527 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1975). In United States v. Lebya, 627 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980), also decided during this survey period, the Tenth Circuit found that
sufficient "articulable facts" were present to justify a Bngnoni-Pnce stop since the car in that
case was travelling at night on a road near a border often used to transport illegal aliens, was
heavily loaded, and contained back seat passengers who appeared to be "slouching down" to
avoid detection when the car was illuminated. Id at 1063.
19821
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way just prior to reaching it does not supply the requisite suspicion for a
stop.
The appellate court in Meyman also relied upon Brignoni-Ponce in hold-
ing that bending over the bed of the truck to pat the "lumpy objects" was
within the constitutional parameters of the investigatory stop.2 3 Under
Br'gnoni-Ponce, an officer may stop a car and investigate the circumstances
that provoked suspicion.2 4 According to the Tenth Circuit, the lumpy ob-
jects under the tarp constituted a suspicious circumstance, the investigation
of which was a constitutional minimal intrusion upon the truck's
occupants.
25
The court's opinion represents a significant extension of Brignoni-Ponce
principles. Bngnoni-Ponce does not expressly authorize, in the absence of
probable cause, the investigation challenged here; it only permits an officer
to question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigra-
tion status, and ask them to explain any suspicious circumstances. Any fur-
ther detention or search should be based on consent or probable cause. 26 By
condoning investigatory conduct beyond mere questioning as permissible
"minimum intrusion," the Tenth Circuit obscures the distinction between a




1. Searches Incident to an Arrest
In United States v. Gay,28 the right to search incident to arrest was at issue
before the Tenth Circuit. In this case, FBI agents had a warrant for appel-
lant Gay's arrest as a federal escapee. En route to the intended arrest of Gay
at a Denver garage, the agents heard on their car radio of a bank robbery by
someone matching Gay's description. When the FBI agents arrested Gay at
the garage, they searched him and seized considerable currency which they
discovered in Gay's possession. This currency was used to convict Gay of the
bank robbery.
2 9
The Tenth Circuit relied on two cases to uphold the constitutionality of
both the full search of Gay and the seizure of the currency. The court cited
Chj'nel v. Cafonmt'a30 for the proposition that the arresting officer may seize
any evidence found on the defendant at the time of the arrest. The court
also relied on United States v. Simpson,31 an earlier Tenth Circuit case, to the
23. 630 F.2d at 784.
24. 422 U.S. at 881.
25. 630 F.2d at 784.
26. Id at 881-82.
27. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), the Supreme Court held
that a border patrol officer may not search the car of a suspected illegal alien without probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 10.5(0 (1978 & Supp. 1981).
28. 623 F.2d 673 (10th Cir.), cert. dened, 101 S. Ct. 366 (1980).
29. I at 675.
30. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
31. 453 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir.), cert. dntid, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
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effect that the arresting officer may, pursuant to a search incident to an ar-
rest, seize a totally unrelated object which provides grounds for prosecution
of a crime different than that for which the accused was arrested. The court
concluded that anything found on a defendant's person during a search inci-
dent to an arrest may be used as evidence in the prosecution of an offense
unrelated to the one leading to the arrest.
3 2
The Tenth Circuit apparently did not consider it significant that the
FBI agents had reason to suspect Gay of robbing the bank at the time they
arrested him as a federal escapee. Thus, the court did not address the ques-
tion of whether an arrest warrant for one crime may justify an intentional
search for evidence of another.3 3 By seizing the currency pursuant to a
search following Gay's arrest as a detainee, the FBI agents avoided judicial
process for establishing probable cause to arrest Gay on suspicion of bank
robbery. The court's opinion also ignores the issue of whether the agents had
probable cause to seize the currency at the time of Gay's arrest.
34
2. Searches of Persons Pursuant to a Premises Search Warrant
In United States v. Sporleder,35 police officers, in executing a premises
search warrant, also searched the defendant, thereby discovering and seizing
some methamphetamine in the defendant's possession. Upon challenge, the
Government attempted to justify the search as a constitutionally permissible
patdown for weapons. In ruling that the methamphetamine should have
been suppressed, the appellate court noted that the facts in Sporleder were
similar to those presented in Ybarra v. Ilhnois.
3 6
Under Ybarra, probable cause to search a location does not support a
search of a person who happens to be there during execution of the warrant.
That the person searched in Sporleder was an object of the Government's sus-
picion that led to the search of the premises was of no consequence.3 7 The
Sporleder court concluded that the search, unconstitutional under Ybarra, also
could not be justified under Terry v. Ohio38 as a patdown for weapons. Ac-
cording to Terry, the officers must have a reasonable belief the suspect is
armed and presently dangerous in order to conduct a limited search for
32. 623 F.2d at 675.
33. In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), the Supreme Court upheld the seizure of
evidence concerning a defendant's suspected espionage activities pursuant to a search incident
to arrest for immigration violations. An argument can be made, however, that an intended
search based upon probable cause of a separate crime should be supported by a separate war-
rant because warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Set
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971), where such an argument is implied. The
weakness of this argument lies in its emphasis of technical over practical considerations.
34. Seizure of items pursuant to a lawful search must be based upon probable cause that
the items seized are evidence of some crime. State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966).
See aLto Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), W. LAFAVE, szipra note 23, at § 5.20).
35. 635 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1980).
36. 444 U.S. 85 (1979). In Ybarra, police officers in execution of a search warrant for a
tavern also searched a patron of the tavern, thereby violating his fourth amendment rights. The
Supreme Court in Ybarra recognized that the right to privacy under the fourth amendment
protects persons, not places, so that each patron's rights are distinct from those of the tavern's
proprietor. Id at 91-92.
37. 635 F.2d at 814.
38. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
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weapons. Since the Government presented no evidence in Sporleder leading
to such a belief, the search was unconstitutional under Terry. The Govern-
ment's final point in Sporleder, that the searching officer felt a metal object in
the defendant's pocket, did not support a reasonable belief before the search
that the defendant was armed.
39
3. Searches of a Dwelling
In two cases decided during this survey period, the Tenth Circuit held
that the Government had failed to meet its heavy burden of justifying a
warrantless search of a dwelling. In United States v. Ochoa-A/manza,40 an of-
ficer conducting an investigation of illegal aliens had reason to believe the
aliens had entered a particular house. Pursuant to his investigation, the of-
ficer requested permission to enter the house from a six-year old child. Upon
entering the house, the officer saw the suspected aliens.
4 '
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court decision that the Govern-
ment had failed to meet its burden of proving that the six-year old freely,
intelligently and knowingly gave consent to a search of the house. 42 The
appellate court thus did not directly address the issue of whether a six-year
old child has the capacity to waive another's fourth amendment rights.
Judge Barrett, in dissent, distinguished consent to enter a house from
consent to search the house. Judge Barrett reasoned that assuming consent
to enter the house was valid, the suspected aliens were discovered by the in-
vestigating officer in plain view without the officer searching the house.
43
Whether the officer intended to search upon entering was according to
Judge Barrett, speculation irrelevant to proper fourth amendment analysis.
He concluded that confusion between lawful entry and lawful search will
result in discouragement of customary and proper police investigatory
procedures.
44
Despite Judge Barrett's admonition in Ochoa-Almanza, the Tenth Circuit
in another case decided during this survey period presumed that police of-
ficers who entered a dwelling did so with intent to search. In United States v.
Anthon, 45 the defendant, Anthon, was arrested outside his motel room. The
arresting officers took Anthon back into his room to collect -his personal be-
longings, where they discovered and seized various items used against
Anthon at trial.
46
The appellate court first noted that no exigent circumstances justified a
warrantless search of the motel room incident to an arrest in the lobby.4 7 In
39. 635 F.2d at 814.
40. 623 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1980).
41. Id at 677.
42. Id The court applied the three-part test set out in United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d
883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977), in determining whether consent to search the house was given
knowingly.
43. 623 F.2d at 678 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
44. Id at 680.
45. 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981).
46. Id at 672.
47. Id at 675. This point of law was decided upon similar facts in Vale v. Louisiana, 399
[Vol. 59:2
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holding that the evidence should have been suppressed, the court ruled that
the officers' entry into and presence in the hotel room, absent Anthon's re-
quest or consent, violated Anthon's fourth amendment rights, even though
the agents found the seized items once they were inside the motel room in a
manner inoffensive to the Constitution.48  Evidently, where the intent to
search a dwelling is shown by the police officers' conduct, the officers' unin-
vited entry into a dwelling violates the occupant's rights regardless of
whether the officers subsequently search the dwelling or find evidence in
plain view.
D. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
In United States v. Weller, 49 the defendant, Weller, was arrested for sus-
pected participation in a bank robbery. Weller made statements, later sup-
pressed, to the police that he and the known principal to the robbery
travelled from Oregon to Pueblo, Colorado, in a particular Monte Carlo
automobile. A Monte Carlo with Oregon license plates was found later
parked near the bank by a Colorado Bureau of Investigation agent. The car
was towed into the basement of the police building. When the police asked
Weller if he wanted to retrieve his personal effects from the car, Weller said
he did and proceeded to take a small box out of the trunk. The box con-
tained $1390 in cash; the money was inventoried and later used as evidence
against Weller. 50
The Tenth Circuit refused to suppress this evidence as resulting from an
illegal search of the Monte Carlo. Rather, the court concluded that no
search occurred in that the money was discovered pursuant to Weller's own
request to retrieve certain belongings from the trunk.5 '
The appellate court did not consider the fruit of the poisonous tree doc-
trine applicable, despite Weller's claim that the Monte Carlo incident was
"fruit" stemming from Weller's statements to the Pueblo police. Again, the
court focused on the voluntary nature of Weller's retrieval of the money as
dispositive of the issue.52 Such analysis avoided the question of whether the
Monte Carlo itself would have been discovered but for the police's illegal
questioning of Weller. If the car would not have been impounded but for
Weller's suppressed statements, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is at
least relevant to Weller's constitutional challenge. 5 3 If the appellate court
U.S. 30 (1970), in which a search of a house incident to an arrest on the house's front steps was
found to be unconstitutional.
48. 648 F.2d at 675-76.
49. 652 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1981).
50. Id at 968.
51. Id, at 969.
52. The court during this survey period also dismissed a "fruit of the poisonous tree" claim
in United States v. Leonard, 630 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1980). In Leonard, the court held that a
gun discovered in a glove compartment through illegal questioning need not be suppressed,
since the gun would have been found anyway through the customary inventory of the im-
pounded van. Id. at 791.
53. Under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), evidence which is an indirect
product of illegal police conduct must be suppressed, unless the evidence largely resulted from
an independent and legal source, such as the defendant's voluntary confession.
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considered Weller's voluntary request to retrieve his personal belongings as
sufficient attenuation to "dissipate the taint" of the illegality, such reasoning
was not expressed in the opinion.
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Double Jeopardy
In United States v. Central Liquor Co. 4 the Government indicted two
small partnerships and the most active partner of each for Sherman Act
55
violations. The defendants appealed prior to trial, the trial court's denial of
their motion to dismiss the indictment. As grounds for the appeal, appel-
lants urged that indictment of both the small partnerships and the individ-
ual partner of each for the same activity is precluded by the double jeopardy
clause. As support for their interlocutory appeal, the appellants principally
relied on Abnq v. United States56 in which the Supreme Court decided that a
denial of a double jeopardy claim may be appealed when denial of the claim
would place the defendants in the position of undergoing a second trial for
the same offense.
57
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the
double jeopardy clause protects both the right not to be tried more than
once for the same offense and the right not to receive multiple convictions for
the same offense. 58 In denying the defendant's interlocutory appeal, the ap-
pellate court noted that immediate review of the trial court's rejection of a
double jeopardy claim protects only the right against multiple prosecutions;
the defendant may appeal prior to trial only when he has already undergone
one trial for the offense. That the multiple counts in this case led to in-
creased attorney expenses and complexity of the issues does not constitute
multiple prosecution according to the court. The court therefore held that
the Abnqy doctrine did not apply to these defendants. 59
The appellate court concluded that protection against multiple convic-
tions could best be reviewed upon final order by the trial court. If the trial
results in conviction of only the partners or the partnerships, then no double
jeopardy claim would be presented; the clause does not protect against the
increased probability of a single conviction arising out of multiple charges.
If both partners and partnerships are convicted, post-conviction appeal sup-
ported by a trial record would provide an appropriate remedy.
6°
54. 628 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1980).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
56. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
57. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), only "final decisions" are appealable; AbnOy held that
at least some dismissals of double jeopardy claims may be considered as final decisions under the
statute. In United States v. Eggert, 624 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1980), decided in this survey period,
the Tenth Circuit held that an interlocutory appeal of a motion to dismiss an indictment on the
grounds that the indictment violated terms of a plea agreement does not involve double jeop-
ardy, and falls outside the Abney exception.
58. 628 F.2d at 1266. See Comment, Statutoy Implementation of Double Jeopard Clauses: New
Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
59. 628 F.2d at 1266-67.
60. Id
[Vol. 59:2
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The Supreme Court decided in United States o. DinitZ6 1 that retrial is not
available to the prosecution when, through its own misconduct, the prosecu-
tion provokes the defense to request a mistrial in order to further the prose-
cution's chances of conviction upon retrial. In United States v. Rios, 62 the
Tenth Circuit held that double jeopardy considerations are equally applica-
ble when prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal of conviction on appeal,
as when the misconduct leads to granting of the mistrial motion in the first
instance. That the mistrial grounds are accepted as valid only on appeal is
irrelevant to double jeopardy concerns.
6 3
The appellate court further decided in Rios that while prosecutorial
misconduct denied the defendants a fair trial, retrial was still available be-
cause the prosecutor did not intend, as in Dinitz, to cause a mistrial request
in order to further the chances of conviction upon retrial.64 The court relied
on its earlier United States v. Leonard65 decision for the proposition that the
prosecutor's bad faith in the abstract, absent intent to provoke a mistrial
request, will not bar retrial of the case. The court held that the record did
not indicate such intent on the part of the prosecution, because a strong case
had been made against the defendant, Government witnesses might not
have been available again, and the prosecutor had stated that he did not
want to retry the case.
6 6
Judge McKay, dissenting, disagreed with the reasoning of the majority
that the double jeopardy clause is not violated unless the prosecutor's pur-
pose is to obtain a mistrial. Judge McKay indicated that prosecutorial bad
faith, present in this case, is sufficient to bar retrial under Dinitz. He quoted
language from Lee v. United States,67 characterizing the Dinitz rule, that re-
trial is barred when the prosecutorial error was intended to provoke the mis-
trial motion or "was otherwise 'motivated by bad faith or undertaken to
harrass or prejudice' the petitioner."
' 8
In United States v. Combs, 69 the court was faced with the issue of whether
acceptance of a guilty plea on one count of an indictment precludes prosecu-
tion of a second count which charges the same offense. The defendant,
Combs, pled guilty to count I of bank larceny, and was later convicted of
bank robbery under count II. The trial judge merged the verdicts based on
the plea and the jury conviction, and handed down one sentence of twenty
years. 70 Combs appealed on double jeopardy grounds.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that bank larceny and bank robbery are
indeed lesser and greater forms of the same offense, and may not be the basis
61. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
62. 637 F.2d 728 (10th Cir. 1980).
63. Id at 729; See Comment, 7he DoubeJeopardy Clause and MiVr&&ia Granted on Defendant's
Motiona Wha Kind of Poseauoriat Misconduct Preclues Reprosecution? 18 DUQUESNE L. REv. 103
(1979).
64. 637 F.2d at 729-30.
65. 593 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1979).
66. 637 F.2d at 730.
67. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
68. Id (McKay, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1977)).
69. 634 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, No. 80-1071 (Feb. 23, 1981).
70. Id at 1296.
19821
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of multiple punishment or prosecution. The court held, however, that
Combs was prosecuted and sentenced only once, reasoning that jeopardy did
not attach until Combs was sentenced on the guilty plea. 71 Since Combs
was not sentenced on his plea until conclusion of the trial on the count of
bank robbery, he was faced with only one prosecution for the offense. In
support of this conclusion the court noted that had the offenses been merged
in a single count, no double jeopardy claims could have been presented. The
court then suggested that double jeopardy considerations should not depend
upon how offenses are pled in a single indictment.
72
Again in dissent, Judge McKay criticized the majority decision for ex-
alting form over substance in focusing on imposition of the sentence as the
point when jeopardy attaches. To Judge McKay, this reasoning worked "se-
rious damage to the fabric of double jeopardy protection."7 3 He noted that
"[jjeopardy means exposure to the risk of a determination of guilt or inno-
cence," and suggested that jeopardy attaches not when sentence is imposed,
but when the guilty plea is accepted. 74 Judge McKay cited several cases to
the effect that a judge's acceptance of the plea is analogous to a jury verdict,
and concluded that jeopardy attaches when guilt or innocence is decided,
whether by plea or trial verdict.
Judge McKay's partial dissent would seem the better supported and
better reasoned opinion. The majority relied upon two Third Circuit deci-
sions for the proposition that jeopardy does not attach until sentencing on
the plea, yet Judge McKay correctly pointed out that the issue in the Third
Circuit is unclear; another case held that jeopardy attached upon acceptance
of the plea. 75 In the absence of clear case law to the contrary, the practical
effect of acceptance of the plea in terminating the issue of guilt would seem
to warrant attachment of jeopardy. The majority decision is, however, sup-
ported by the recognition in other circumstances that "the double jeopardy




In United States v. Jones,7 7 the Tenth Circuit considered the issue of
whether a defendant's right against self-incrimination is violated by use of a
psychiatric report at a sentencing hearing. In Jones, the trial court ordered
the defendant to undergo psychiatric evaluation prior to sentencing on a
guilty plea to possession of counterfeit obligations. During this evaluation,
Jones told the psychiatrist that he had committed several other crimes, in-
71. Id at 1298.
72. Id
73. Id at 1300 (McKay, J., dissenting in part).
74. Id
75. The majority relied upon United States v. Goldman, 352 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1965) and
United States v. Scarlata, 214 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1954). Judge McKay cited United States v.
Jerry, 487 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1973), to support his contrary view.
76. Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491, 493 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding that a guilty plea to a lesser
offense does not operate as an acquittal on all greater offenses, even though a jury conviction on
a lesser offense does have that effect).
77. 640 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 59:2
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cluding the murder of a friend. The trial court considered these admissions
only insofar as they showed that Jones believed he had committed the al-
leged crimes.
78
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis with the observation that regard-
less of fifth amendment concerns, the trial court must base its sentencing on
true and accurate information. 79 Since it was not verified that Jones actu-
ally committed the crimes mentioned in the psychiatric report, the trial
court could not have used the statements in the report as substantive evi-
dence that Jones committed them.80 Furthermore, the sentencing process is
within the scope of fifth amendment protection. Any involuntary statements
by Jones included in the psychiatric report could not be used against him on
the issue of guilt.8 '
Under the facts of this case, however, the Tenth Circuit held that no
error was committed by the trial court. Neither the mandate that sentencing
be based on accurate information nor the privilege against self-incrimination
prohibits the court from considering the statements as pertinent to Jones'
mental status at the time of sentencing.8 2 The appellate court concluded
that the record reflected that the trial court considered the statements only
for that purpose. The court of appeals did recognize that in Smith v. Estelle8 3
the Fifth Circuit had held that a defendant could not be forced to undergo
psychiatric observations to determine the defendant's dangerousness at time
of trial. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Estelle on the facts, including the
fact that the defendant in Estelle had been charged with a capital offense.
84
C. Due Process
1. Right to Know Identity and Existence of Informer
In United States v. Perez-Gomez,8 5 the defendant challenged the Govern-
ment's refusals to advise the defendant of whether an informer was involved
in the case, and to disclose the informer's identity. The Government, in re-
sponding to a question on the omnibus hearing report, indicated that there
was no informer. Upon the defendant's motion to compel existence of the
suspected informer, the trial court ordered that the existence be disclosed.
The informer's existence was then revealed, and the trial court determined
after an in camera proceeding that the informer's identity need not be dis-
closed to defense counsel.
8 6
The Tenth Circuit recognized that the Government's failure to answer
the question on the omnibus report did not constitute reversible error absent
78. Id at 287.
79. Id The Tenth Circuit cited United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976), in support of this proposition.
80. 640 F.2d at 286.
81. The Supreme Court has recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination can be
daimed in any judicial proceeding. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1967).
82. 640 F.2d at 288.
83. 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), afd, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (131).
84. 640 F.2d at 288.
85. 638 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1981).
86. Id at 217.
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a showing of prejudice. 87 Since the defendant learned of the informer's
existence prior to trial, the appellate court held that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the Government's admittedly improper actions.
The court then noted that in determining whether the informer's iden-
tity must be disclosed to the defense "a balance must be struck between the
public interest in protecting the flow of information and the individual's
right to prepare his defense." 8 In Perez-Gomez, there was a strong public
interest in protecting the identity of an informer who was currently involved
in ongoing investigations. The court held that the defendant's interest was
less strong, in that the informer could not have supplied information useful
in defense of the charges. The defendant was arrested for driving a car full
of illegal aliens. The defendant did not raise the issue of probable cause at
trial, so any information the informer may have had in this regard was irrel-
evant. The informer did not participate in transportation of the aliens, so
disclosure was not necessary to prepare an entrapment defense. The court
concluded that disclosure of the informer's identity was properly denied.8 9
Finally, the appellate court held that conducting the in camera proceeding
without the presence of defense counsel was not an abuse of the trial court's
discretion.9 0
2. Right to Fair Trial
In Soap o. Carler,9' a habeas corpus petition charged, in part, that the
prosecutor's racial remarks during his closing argument were so unfair as to
deprive the defendant of due process of law. The defendant, a Cherokee
Indian, stood trial for the murder of another Indian. Those present in the
home where the murder occurred were also Cherokees and had been drink-
ing. In his closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that "it is sad to see,
but when you see an Indian that drinks liquor, you see a man that can't
handle it."' 9 2 Later, the prosecutor said: "[y]ou try to impress upon people
that they can change . .. but some people just don't live that way ...
You have a class of people and a situation that exists that you and I can't
change irrespective of what we do. . . -93 The prosecution then suggested
that the alleged murder was "typical of the community in which this acci-
dent occurred." 94 No objection was made to these statements at trial.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed this due process claim as based on "a mi-
nor incident at trial to which no objection was made." 95 Judge Seymour,
dissenting, opined that such an appeal to personal bias, in which the prose-
cutor attempted to place himself and the jury in a class apart from the Indi-
ans and the defendant, impermissibly threatened the defendant's right to a
87. Id. The Tenth Circuit relied on United States v. Phillips, 585 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir.
1978), for this proposition.
88. 638 F.2d at 218.
89. Id
90. Id
91. 632 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denzed, 101 S. Ct. 2021 (1981).
92. Id at 878.
93. Id
94. Id
95. Id at 876.
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fair trial. 96 Judge Seymour cited Haynes v. McKendrck97 for the applicable
standard that in absence of overwhelming evidence of guilt, the probability
of prejudice is sufficient to overturn a conviction. Since the defendant was
convicted by circumstantial evidence and the statements made were not in-
significant, Judge Seymour concluded that there was sufficient probability of
prejudice, in the absence of mitigating circumstances, to deprive the defend-
ant of his constitutional rights. 98
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Efective Assistance of Counsel
In Dyer v. Crisp,9 9 a case decided during the last survey period, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the stricter "reasonably competent" test over the pre-
vious "sham, farce and mockery" test as the standard for determining
whether a defendant has received effective assistance of counsel as guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment. 0 0 Several cases decided by the Tenth Circuit
during this survey period have established some guidelines for what the
court will consider as "reasonably competent" counsel.
The cases decided subsequent to Dyer have emphasized that defense
counsel's reasonable but possibly unfortunate choice of strategy, which in
hindsight may have been handled differently, is not a valid basis for a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. In United States v. Payne,' 0 1 the Tenth
Circuit held that defense counsel's decision not to call any defense witnesses,
because he believed the Government failed to meet its burden of proving the
defendant's guilt, was a reasonable strategy choice. In United States v.
Miller,10 2 the appellate court decided that failure to call a specific witness
whose testimony is only cumulative in nature is also a reasonably competent
decision.
The court of appeals also rejected a sixth amendment claim in United
States v. Johns.'0 3 In this case, defense counsel did not contest a charge of
parole violation in a probation revocation hearing. The appellate court held
that defense counsel's failure to contest the charge was not per se incompe-
tent, in that counsel may have desired to avoid having the matter more fully
explored by a judge who would eventually impose sentence.' 0 4 Thus, in ap-
peals on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Tenth Circuit ap-
parently will infer a reasonable strategy choice by defense counsel where one
is available. In such circumstances, the appellant may need to reach beyond
96. Id at 879 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
97. 481 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1973).
98. 632 F.2d at 879-80 (Seymour, J., dissenting). There were no eyewitnesses to the mur-
der. Id at 880.
99. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
100. The Tenth Circuit followed the precedent of all the other circuits except the Second
Circuit in adopting the stricter test. See Criminal Law and Procedure, Seventh Anmual Tenth Ciraut
Suny, 58 DEN. L.J. 319, 335 (1980).
101. 641 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1981).
102. 643 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1981).
103. 638 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1981).
104. Id at 224.
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what was done and reveal an improper purpose behind the challenged act in
order to present a successful claim of ineffective counsel.
In Marlinez v. Romero,10 5 the Tenth Circuit rejected a claim of ineffective
counsel in a habeas corpus action. This claim was based on defense counsel's
advice to the defendant to accept a plea bargain condition that the defend-
ant not contest identity at the subsequent habitual offender proceeding.
Through application of New Mexico's habitual offender statute, the defend-
ant was sentenced to a ten- to thirty-year prison term. In compliance with
the plea agreement, defense counsel did not bring to the sentencing court's
attention that a previous conviction was secured after the defendant signed a
form, possibly involuntarily, waiving his right to counsel.10 6 In holding that
the defense counsel's advice to the plea bargain was reasonable, the Tenth
Circuit focused on both the likelihood of conviction on the merits and a
much harsher sentence in a trial on the original charge.1
0 7
In United States v. Golub,"' the Tenth Circuit did find a defendant's
claim of ineffective counsel valid. In Golub, when the defendant's original
counsel withdrew from the case, the trial court refused to grant a continu-
ance of the trial scheduled to begin in two weeks. A relative of the defendant
agreed to represent him, and received the case file six days before trial. The
relative lacked recent experience in criminal law, and due to time and logis-
tical constraints was unable to interview witnesses. 0 9
The appellate court relied on Wo/fs v. Brtton, I0 an Eighth Circuit deci-
sion, for the applicable standards in determining whether a defendant has
received effective assistance of counsel under such circumstances. These
standards include "(1) the time afforded for investigation and preparation;
(2) the experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the complex-
ity of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel."'
I I
The appellate court concluded that the defendant's representation by his
relative failed to conform to any of these accepted standards. Defense coun-
sel's representation under the circumstances, including the seriousness of the
charge and complexity of the legal issues and defenses, was per se
ineffective. 112
In reaching its conclusion that the defendant's sixth amendment rights
were violated in Golub, the Tenth Circuit refused to consider whether defense
counsel's conduct in trial prejudiced the defendant. Rather, the court held
that regardless of counsel's conduct in trial the surrounding circumstances
105. 626 F.2d 807 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 101 S. Ct. 585 (1980).
106. Id at 809.
107. Id If the defendant had been convicted of the original charge, he would have faced,
depending on the outcome of challenges to prior convictions, a possible sentence of 50 to 150
years. Id
108. 638 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980).
109. Id at 187.
110. 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975).
111. Id at 309; 638 F.2d at 189. For discussion of what investigation of a case is considered
necessary to criminal defense, see ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, § 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1980)
(tentative draft).
112. 638 F.2d at 189. The defendant was charged with mail fraud, and upon conviction
received a five-year sentence.
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evidenced prejudice.'" 3 This same reasoning was used in United Slates v.
Payne,' 14 where the court of appeals noted that the Government has the
burden of establishing lack of prejudice when "incompetence of counsel is
pervasive . . . or other unusual circumstances exist."' "1 5 The court recog-
nized in Payne that this shift of the burden of proof in certain instances may
be questionable in light of United States v. Morrison, 1 6 in which the Supreme
Court held that a violation of sixth amendment rights does not merit rever-
sal of a conviction absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant.'17
In United States v. Weninger, 1 8 the Tenth Circuit considered whether ap-
pellant Weninger's refusal to hire an attorney within a reasonable time con-
stituted a waiver of his right to effective assistance of counsel. Weninger
appeared pro se to defend a charge of failure to file federal tax returns. He
contended at trial that he deliberately did not file the returns as a protest
against the conditions in our country and that he considered the income tax
laws to be invalid. The trial court recognized that Weninger's protest de-
fense was without legal merit and strongly urged him to retain counsel. The
trial court provided a recess to allow Weninger an opportunity to retain
counsel, but Weninger requested additional time to find a lawyer with Wen-
inger's unique political and legal views. The trial court refused to grant such
a continuance, and the trial proceeded. 119
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision that Weninger's
failure to hire an attorney, when given the opportunity, constituted a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of counsel. ' 2 0 In so doing
the appellate court recognized that "the right to assistance of counsel does
not imply the absolute right to counsel of one's choice."' 2 1 The court con-
cluded that Weninger was given as much opportunity to retain counsel as
the effective administration of criminal justice allowed. In light of this
waiver of the right to counsel, the court noted that Weninger could not com-
plain that his own representation was ineffective.
122
B. Right to Trial by juy
In United States v. McAlister,' 23 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of
113. Id at 190.
114. 641 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 867-68.
116. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
117. Id at 668-69.
118. 624 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1980).
119. Id at 164-66.
120. Id at 167; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has the right to
appear in his own defense); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of right to assistance
of counsel must be knowing and intelligent).
121. 624 F.2d at 166; see United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978) (defendant is
not entitled to the services of a particular lawyer, when such services would lead to a conflict of
interest on the part of counsel); Kates v. Nelson, 435 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1970) (defendant is not
entitled to appointment of different counsel upon expressed dissatisfaction with original ap-
pointed counsel); United States v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1969) (defendant is not enti-
tled to a continuance of longer than one weekend in order to retain counsel upon assertion of
dissatisfaction with appointed counsel).
122. 624 F.2d at 167.
123. 630 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1980).
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whether a defendant charged with trespass on a nuclear plant site, a crime
with a maximum penalty of $1000, had a constitutional right to trial by jury.
The trial court had refused the defendant's jury request on the grounds that
the charged offense was petty and therefore outside the scope of the sixth
amendment's jury trial guarantee. 1
24
The appellate court recognized that several circuits, including the
Tenth Circuit, had traditionallly used 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) as a guideline for
what constitutes petty offenses.' 25 Under this statute, any crime, the penalty
for which does not exceed either six months imprisonment or a fine of $500,
is a petty offense. 126 The court admitted that in Murnz v. Hojan,12 7 the
Supreme Court had held that sixth amendment concerns are not to be deter-
mined solely under the provisions of the statute, and that a $500 fine need
not be considered "serious" in all circumstances. In Muniz, the Supreme
Court upheld a $10,000 contempt fine levied on a 13,000-member labor
union in the absence of a jury.
128
The Tenth Circuit refused to apply Munz in considering whether an
individual is entitled to a jury. Instead, the court followed the Ninth Circuit
in acknowledging that constitutional rights should not vary depending on
the wealth of individual defendants. '2 9 In the absence of any other objective
criteria by which to judge a crime's seriousness, the appellate court con-
cluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) should remain the benchmark for determina-
tion of an individual's right to jury trial. 130 Since the defendant had been
charged with committing a crime with a maximum penalty of over $1500, he
should have been afforded a jury trial.
C. Suafic'enO , of Miranda Wamnigs
In UnitedStates v. Anihon ,13 1 the Tenth Circuit considered whether state-
ments elicited before the defendant had been fully advised of his fifth and
sixth amendment rights should be suppressed. Anthon, arrested under suspi-
cion of possessing a pound of cocaine, was initially advised that he had a
right to remain silent, that anything he said could and would be used against
him in court, and that he had a right to counsel. He was not told that he
had a right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one, that he had a
right to have counsel present during questioning, and that he had a right to
stop questioning at any time. ' 32 After this partial advisement of his rights,
Anthon admitted that a small vial of cocaine and a marijuana cigarette
found in his motel room were his. When Anthon reached the DEA office, an
124. Id. at 773.
125. Id
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976).
127. 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
128. Id. at 476-77.
129. 630 F.2d at 774;see United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding
18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976) as the monetary measure of the "seriousness" of a fine).
130. 630 F.2d at 774. The court cited Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and Frank
v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969), as requiring objective criteria by which to measure a
crime's seriousness.
131. 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981).
132. Id. at 672.
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agent, in the words of his own testimony, "again advised him of his
rights.' 1 3 3 At this time, Anthon, in an attempt to plea bargain with the
Government agents, acknowledged participation in the drug transaction
under investigation.' 34 Anthon was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute a quantity of cocaine.
The Tenth Circuit decided without discussion that Anthon's admission
to possessing the vial of cocaine and marijuana cigarette should have been
suppressed. The appellate court simply held that the statements "were im-
properly admitted inasmuch as Anthon was not fully advised of his Miranda
rights at the time he was originally arrested."' 3 5 The court ruled, however,
that Anthon's admission to participating in the transaction involving the
pound of cocaine was properly admitted, since the Government agent had
again advised him of his rights prior to this interrogation. The court con-
cluded that nothing in the record indicated that this final advisement was
inadequate. The court supported this conclusion with the recognition that
these statements were given voluntarily in an attempt to plea bargain with
the agents, and Miranda v. Arizona 136 does not bar admission of such volun-
tary statements. 1
37
Judge Seymour dissented, pointing out that the Government had failed
to meet its heavy burden under Miranda of proving that adequate warnings
were given and knowingly waived. She believed the majority was unjustified
in presuming that the final warnings were adequate, particularly in light of
the inadequacy of previous warnings. 138 If the warnings were not adequate,
then Anthon's fifth and sixth amendment rights could not have been know-
ingly waived. Nor did Judge Seymour believe that the statements could be
admitted as purely voluntary; the Miranda Court had recognized that custo-
dial interrogation contains inherently compelling pressures in response to
which no statement may be considered voluntary in the absence of sufficient
Miranda warnings. 1
39
Anthon raises the interesting question of whether a defendant's state-
ments made during attempted cooperation with Government agents for leni-
ency or immunity purposes, while the defendant is under arrest, may be
considered voluntary. 14 Since such statements are not in response to spe-
cific questions and are made for the defendant's own purposes, they are ar-
guably free of compulsion. However, such reasoning would appear to offend
the spirit if not the law of Miranda and Rhode Island v. Innis,14 ' which taken
133. Id at 672-73.
134. Id
135. Id
136. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
137. 648 F.2d at 674.
138. Id at 679 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
139. Id at 680. Judge Seymour quoted from Miranda examples of voluntary statements as
"a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess a crime, or a person
who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make." 384 U.S. at
478.
140. While the Tenth Circuit majority considered Anthon's statements to be voluntary, this
conclusion was not necessary to the holding and was, therefore, dicta. 648 F.2d at 676.
141. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
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In Parkhurst . Wyoming," 4 3 the defendant appealed the dismissal of an
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'44 The defendant had sought both
monetary relief and release from prison for his unconstitutional arrest, con-
viction and imprisonment, for murder and assault. The trial court had con-
strued all the claims as lying in habeas corpus, and denied relief for failure to
exhaust state remedies. 145 Appeal of the defendant's conviction was cur-
rently pending in the Wyoming Supreme Court when this action was
brought in federal court.
The Tenth Circuit held that while the defendant's request for release
from prison was cognizable .only through habeas corpus, the request for
money damages was a permissible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.146 The
appellate court cited Woo9v. McDone// 4 7 for the procedural rule that a sec-
tion 1983 action may proceed while exhaustion of remedies runs its course in
state proceedings. Nevertheless, the court concluded that where the case for
damages arose from a claim of unconstitutional conviction, it was appropri-
ate to stay the action pending resolution of the defendant's state appeal.148
To handle the section 1983 action would be to decide the issues currently on
appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court which, the court of appeals resolved,
would work undesirable interference with state criminal proceedings.
Philhps v. Carey"19 addressed the issue of what procedures must be fol-
lowed in order to dismiss prisoner complaints informapaupers as being with-
out merit. In Phi/lips, the trial court, after review of the defendant's prior
litigation history, concluded that the defendant had abused court process by
filing a series of frivolous complaints. The trial court set aside previousforma
pauper's authorization for a pending action, and placed certain limitations
on future actions brought by the appellant. 150
The Tenth Circuit recognized that the trial court's actions were not per
se improper; frivolous actions which cannot present a rational argument may
142. The Supreme Court in Int& succinctly held that "[a] practice that the police should
know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to
interrogation." 446 U.S. at 301.
143. 641 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981).
144. This civil rights law provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute...
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
145. 641 F.2d at 776. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976), any claim of unconstitutional con-
finement, pursuant to judgment of a state court, lies in habeas corpus and may not be heard in
federal court unless the petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State."
146. 641 F.2d at 776.
147. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
148. 641 F.2d at 777.
149. 638 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1981).
150. Id at 208.
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be dismissed, and the imposition of restrictions on future actions is permissi-
ble in "well documented and extreme cases." 15 1 The appellate court
stressed, however, that restrictions on an indigent person's access to the
courtroom are limited, and must be based on a record justifying such use of
the trial court's discretion. In the absence of the requisite procedures at the
trial level, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's summary dismissal of
the action informa pauperis and remanded for further proceedings. 152 The
appellate court's reversal was thus based on the paucity of the record and
not on a particular violation of the defendant prisoner's rights. The appel-
late court did not say what specific procedures must be followed before a
forma pauperis petition may be dismissed.
V. CRIMINAL LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Conspiragy
In United States v. McMurray,153 the Tenth Circuit was faced with the
difficult task of deciding when apparently unrelated incidents should be
treated as parts of a single conspiracy. The alleged conspiracy involved a
sham investment plan to support an Application for Guarantee to the Small
Business Administration (SBA). Under SBA regulations, small businesses
could apply to the SBA for issuance of government guaranteed debentures.
The amount of debentures available through the SBA depended upon the
applicant's paid-in capital.
The alleged illegal acts in McMurray consisted of the "hub" defendants,
officers of the applicant investment company, borrowing money from
"spoke" defendants to swell the company's paid-in capital. 154 After submis-
sion of the applications, the invested money was returned to contributing
defendants by way of sham loans. A grand jury handed down several indict-
ments of conspiracy to defraud the government based on these transactions,
treating the separate investments as distinct conspiracies. After conviction
upon one indictment, the appellants sought to dismiss further indictments of
conspiracy on double jeopardy grounds, claiming that the involved actions
constituted a single conspiracy for which they could be tried only once.
The Tenth Circuit cited Blumenthal v. United States' 55 and Kotteakos v.
United States 5 6 as the applicable law on whether defendants who participate
in only a portion of a criminal activity may be considered as members of the
same conspiracy with other peripheral defendants of whose identity and ac-
tivities they are unaware. In Kotteakos, the principal defendant acted as a
broker for placement of illegal loans on behalf of unrelated clients. The
Supreme Court held that since each illegal loan transaction was complete in
itself, individual client defendants who had no knowledge of or concern for
151. Id. at 209.
152. Id
153. No. 78-1928, 1929 (10th Cir. Feb. 10, 1981).
154. Id slip op. at 3.
155. 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
156. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
1982]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the others could not be treated as members of a single conspiracy.' 57 In
Blumenthal, however, the Supreme Court held that the purchasers, middle-
men, and sellers of an illegal whiskey distribution scheme were members of a
single conspiracy, although ignorant even of the existence of the other mem-
bers in the distribution chain, since they all had knowledge of and a stake in
the overall plan.' 58
In upholding the appellants' double jeopardy claim in McMurray, the
Tenth Circuit likened the defendants' common objective to that found in
Blumenthal. The appellate court found that each of the investing defendants
must have known of the existence of other investors to the capital pool, and
that all shared the single goal of submitting the fraudulent Guarantee Appli-
cation to the SBA. As the court said, "[t]he objective here was to defraud the
SBA by the Application of Guarantee based on fictitious bank deposits. All
the convicted defendants knew the objective-the purpose of the accumula-
tion of funds, and all participated in attaining the objective."'1 59 Judge
Doyle, dissenting, focused on the separation between the independent loan
transactions in claiming that there was no basis for imputing knowledge to
the spoke defendants of similar transactions involving the same hub defend-
ants. t6° Judge Doyle thus saw the facts as similar to those in Kotteakos,
presenting multiple conspiracies.
There is apparent similarity between the arrangement presented here,
where core defendants instigate multiple transactions with isolated defend-
ants, and that in Kotteakos, where each might have been considered as a "hub
and spoke" arrangement different than the "chain" distribution in Blumen-
thai. '6' However, the majority correctly distinguished Kotleakos in empha-
sizing the common objective of the SBA investors; no one defendant was to
be successful unless the single application was accepted. The majority and
dissent differed less regarding the law than in their perceptions of the facts
and the nature of the understanding between the defendants.
In United States v. Johnson, 62 the Tenth Circuit affirmed appellant Arm-
strong's conviction for conspiracy to distribute both marijuana and cocaine,
even though Armstrong was not directly involved in the distribution of co-
caine. Armstrong, an assistant district attorney in Oklahoma, aided his co-
conspirators in the theft of confiscated marijuana by informing them of its
157. Id at 755.
158. 332 U.S. at 557. Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court, stated "the law rightly gives
room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon showing sufficiently the essential
nature of the plan and their connections with it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all
its details or of the participation of others." Id
159. No. 78-1928, 1929, slip op. at 9.
160. Id slip op. at 13 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
161. In Kotteakos, the Supreme Court agreed with the Government that "the pattern was
that of separate spokes meeting in a common center .. " 328 U.S. at 755. The operation of
a criminal enterprise involving the distribution of a commodity, as in Blumenthal, has been lik-
ened to a chain, with each participant a necessary link. Set Note, Resolution of the Multiple Con-
spiraces Issue Via a "Nature of the Enterpise" Analysis: The Resurrection of Agreement, 42 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 243, 257 (1975). For discussion of the multiple conspiracy problem, see id; Note, The
Conspiraty Dilmnuv Proseaution of Group Crnme or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARV. L.
REv. 276 (1948).
162. 645 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1981).
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location and allowing them to steal it. After this transaction, the conspira-
tors' operation was expanded to include the acquisition and sale of cocaine.
Armstrong discussed the cocaine transactions with the other participants,
obtained cocaine for personal use from them, and advised them of the status
of proceedings before a grand jury. '
6 3
The appellate court's conclusion that Armstrong conspired to distribute
cocaine was based on both Armstrong's failure to withdraw from the original
conspiracy and his continued participation with the co-conspirators after
they began distribution of the cocaine. For the court, this constituted suffi-
cient connection with and knowledge of the illegal scheme to warrant con-
viction under Blumenthal.164
While the appellate court pointed out Armstrong's connection with the
co-conspirators, the court did not discuss the intent element. A remaining
question is whether Armstrong actually agreed to participate in the distribu-
tion of cocaine. That he had previously conspired in the theft of marijuana,
an unrelated transaction, is insufficient to prove such agreement, as is Arm-
strong's knowledge of the cocaine distribution and even his purchase of co-
caine for personal use.' 65 That Armstrong warned the other defendants that
they were under suspicion and advised them of the status of grand jury pro-
ceedings, however, does evidence Armstrong's implicit agreement to partici-
pate in the distribution.
B. Interstate Transportation of Securities
In United States v. Sparrow, 166 the defendant was charged with several
counts of interstate transportation of false securities under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314.167 Both counts involved alleged tampering with a Cadillac's certifi-
cate of title issued in Oregon. The first count charged the defendant with
bringing the car into Idaho with a certificate of title which had been altered
by substituting the defendant's name for the actual lienholder's name.
Count II charged the interstate transportation of a new certificate of title
issued in Oregon and sent to a Utah bank which the defendant indicated
would be the new lienholder. Some of the representations which the defend-
ant made to the Oregon authorities in order to indice them to issue the new
certificate of title allegedly were false.168
This appeal had previously been before a Tenth Circuit panel, which
163. Id at 868.
164. 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
165. Knowledge of a conspiracy is insufficient to prove participation in the conspiracy. See
United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940) (knowledge by seller that yeast was bought to
make illegal liquor was insufficient to prove the seller's participation in the conspiracy); Weni-
ger v. United States, 47 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1931) (county sheriff's failure to enforce National
Prohibition Act does not make the sheriff a conspirator to violate the Act).
166. 635 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980).
167. The relevant section of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) provides that "Whoever, with unlawful
or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, al-
tered, or counterfeited securities ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both." The defendant was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1014
(1976) for making a materially false statement to a federally insured bank.
168. 635 F.2d at 795.
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affirmed the conviction on both counts. 169 In hearing the appeal en banc,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction on both counts.
The issue most recently facing the appellate court under Count I was
whether the Government must prove that the security was in a forged or
altered condition at the time of its interstate passage. There was no evidence
that the Oregon certificate of title presented in Utah was actually falsified
before the defendant entered Utah. In upholding the defendant's challenge,
the appellate court agreed that the security must be forged prior to its inter-
state travel in order to warrant conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2314.170 In
reaching this conclusion the court followed precedent set by the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits and strictly construed the criminal statute.17 1 Judge Bar-
rett, who wrote the original panel opinion, dissented, noting that the inter-
state element was included in the statute solely to afford federal jurisdiction,
and that in this case interstate movement of the false certificate of title was
necessary to complete the fraudulent design. 1
72
The appellate court also overturned the conviction for the interstate
transportation of the new certificate of title issued in Oregon. The court
distinguished documents "falsely made" or "false in their execution" from
those "false in fact." The court held that under a Tenth Circuit opinion,
Mareney v. United States, 173 a security that is only false in fact is not "falsely
made, forged, altered, or counterfeited" under the statute. Since the new
certificate of title was what it purported to be, and was false only in content,
the certificate could not be the basis for conviction of transportation of a
falsely made security.' 74 Again in dissent, Judge Barrett stressed that the
State of Oregon was without legal authority to issue the new certificate, so
that it was falsely made as well as false in fact. 1
75
C. Theft and Interstate Commerce
United States v. Luman 176 called into question the sufficiency of evidence
for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2315. This statute prohibits the disposition
of goods moving to interstate commerce, with knowledge that the goods have
been stolen. 177 In Luman, certain oil field drill bits were stolen in Wyoming
and were sold by the defendants to undercover agents in Oklahoma twenty-
eight days later. The defendants claimed that the evidence was insufficient
to show that the defendants knew the property was stolen, or that the drill
169. 614 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1980).
170. 635 F.2d at 796.
171. United States v. Hilyer, 543 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Owens, 460
F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1972).
172. 635 F.2d at 797 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
173. 216 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954).
174. 635 F.2d at 797.
175. Id (Barrett, J., dissenting).
176. 624 F.2d 152 (10th Cir. 1980).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1976) states that "Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells or
disposes of any goods. . . moving as, or which are a part of, or which constitute interstate or
foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen . . . shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
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bits were still moving in interstate commerce. 178
The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the Government must
present direct evidence that the property was known to be stolen, or that it
had recently crossed state lines. Rather, both elements could be proven
through inference arising from established facts.179 The appellate court first
held that unexplained possession of recently stolen property may support a
finding that the possessor knew he was dealing with stolen property. Under
this standard, the jury's guilty verdict was more than justified by the facts
that the defendants were not in the business of selling drill bits, the bits were
sold for less than one tenth of their worth, the bits were new and in their
original boxes, and the transaction took place in a motel parking lot and
involved no receipt or bill of sale.' 80 Regarding the interstate element, the
court further held that unexplained possession in Oklahoma of drill bits sto-
len in Wyoming was sufficient to support the finding that the challenged
transaction was one step in a total scheme of interstate transportation of the
stolen goods.' 8 '
D. False Statements to a Federal Agency
The defendant in United States v. Irwin 182 was convicted for, among
other charges, willingly making false statements in a grant application to a
federal agency, and for knowingly concealing material facts in a matter
within the jurisdiction of the federal agency, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1 0 0 1 .i83 The misrepresentations were made in an application to the Eco-
nomic Development Administration (EDA) for a federal grant. The defend-
ant Irwin was hired by the City of Delta, Colorado to help obtain federal
and state funds to finance a proposed industrial park. Prior to submitting
the grant application, Irwin orally agreed with the industrial park project
engineer to be paid for work in preparing the application.' 184 Under EDA
rules, Irwin's services in preparing the application were ineligible for pay-
ment with EDA funds. Irwin indicated in response to a question on the
grant application that he was not to receive compensation for such services.
Irwin was later appointed Delta's city manager; in this capacity Irwin sub-
mitted bills to EDA for work done on the industrial park. These bills did not
specify that EDA funds would be used to pay Irwin for his services in apply-
178. 624 F.2d at 154.
179. Id at 155. United States v. White, 649 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1981), also decided during
this survey period, held that a jury instruction permitting such an inference did not give rise to a
presumption of guilt and an unconstitutional shift of the burden of proof. For discussion of the
difference between a permissible inference and a presumption, see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 527 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
180. 624 F.2d at 154.
181. Id at 155.
182. 654 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1981).
183. The pertinent portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
184. 654 F.2d at 674.
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ing for the grant. ' 8 5 Irwin was eventually paid for the services with the EDA
funds by the project engineer.'
8 6
The Tenth Circuit decided that under these facts Irwin was properly
convicted of making a false statement of material facts in the grant applica-
tion. The failure to specify, in response to a question on the application, that
Irwin was to receive compensation constituted a false statement.' 8 7 This
statement was material, in that it had a capacity to influence EDA's decision
to offer Delta financial assistance with the industrial park project. 18  The
court concluded that the issue of materiality was one of fact properly before
the jury under an instruction that the statement must have the capacity to
influence "action" by the EDA, instead of "payment" by the EDA, as re-
quested by the defendant.' 8 9
The appellate court did, however, reverse Irwin's conviction for con-
cealing a material fact within the jurisdiction of a federal agency (EDA).
This charge arose out of Irwin's failure to mention on the bills submitted to
EDA that part of the funds would be paid to himself. The court recognized
that it is not illegal for Irwin to omit this information from the bills in the
absence of any legal duty to disclose the information.19° Since the project
engineer was not required under law to indicate the names of every em-
pioyee who was to receive grant funds, it was not unlawful to fail to mention
that Irwin was one of the employees.' 9 '
Unted States v. Woff19 2 also involved interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001,
which prohibits the making of a false statement "in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." Appellant
Wolf was vice-president of Pioneer Energy Corporation which had con-
tracted to furnish Apco Oil Corporation with crude oil. The challenged false
statement was the certification on invoices from Pioneer to Apco of the ship-
ments of "stripper crude oil," while Pioneer actually delivered inferior fuel
oil. This certification was included on monthly reports sent by Apco to the
United States Department of Energy (DOE) as part of an entitlement pro-
gram based on the pricing of different types of crude oil. The certification
allowed Pioneer to receive the higher price for stripper crude allowed under
federal regulations.19 3 Evidence indicated that Wolf was aware of the enti-
tlement program and the significance of the certificate. 194
Wolf contended that the certification on the invoice was not a matter
within the jurisdiction of the DOE or any other federal agency. In finding
that the federal jurisdiction element had been met in this case, the Tenth
185. Id at 675.
186. Id
187. Id at 676.
188. Id at 678.
189. Id at 677.
190. Id 678-79. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980) (petitioner, a
financial printer with "inside" knowledge about a corporation, had no duty to disclose informa-
tion to other individuals with whom the printer was trading stock of the corporation).
191. 654 F.2d at 679.
192. 645 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1981).
193. Id at 24.
194. Id
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Circuit recognized that the false statement need not be made directly to a
federal agency to sustain a section 1001 conviction, as long as federal funds
are involved.1 95 Since the false certification of the type of oil would eventu-
ally affect disbursement of DOE funds to Apco under the entitlement pro-
gram, the false statement was a matter within the jurisdiction of DOE.196
Under these circumstances, it was immaterial that the statements were made
to wrongfully induce a private entity to make payments to which Pioneer
was not entitled, rather than to induce the wrongful disbursement of federal
funds.
E. Aiding and Abetting
In United States v. Cotton, 97 the defendant contended that he was ille-
gally convicted of aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2 in the distribu-
tion of cocaine, a controlled substance.' 98 The defendant argued that since
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
(Act) 199 was designed to include all drug control offenses in one comprehen-
sive act, he could not be convicted of aiding and abetting, an offense not
included in the Act.
2 ° °
The appellate court refused to find that aiding and abetting could not
be combined with a substantive offense in an indictment, no matter how
comprehensive the pertinent statutory scheme. Rather, the court, citing
United States v. Alvil/ar20 ' to the effect that the "language [of 18 U.S.C. § 2]
neither defines nor denounces as criminal any act or omission which, without
it, would have been unlawful," 20 2 held that 18 U.S.C. § 2 need not be specif-
ically incorporated in any particular substantive offense in order to be prop-
erly joined with it in an indictment. The court concluded that aiding and
abetting constitutes an alternative theory of criminal responsibility rather
than a prohibition of specific conduct, and may be appropriately joined with
any substantive charge203
In United States v. Cueto,204 the Tenth Circuit focused on aiding and
abetting as an alternative theory of responsibility in holding that aiding and
abetting need not be specifically charged in the indictment to warrant con-
viction for aiding and abetting at trial. In Cueto the defendant was charged
195. Id. at 25. The appellate court cited cases from five circuits as authority for this rule of
law. The court quoted United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980) to the effect
that, "the necessary link between deception of the non-federal agency and effect on the federal
agency is provided by the federal agency's retention of 'the ultimate authority to see that the
federal funds are properly spent.' " Baker held that submission of false time sheets claiming pay
for hours not actually worked to a federally-funded housing authority violates the statute.
196. 645 F.2d at 25.
197. 646 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1981).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Under this general statute concerning criminal responsibility,
anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" the commission of a crime
"is punishable as a principal."
199. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
200. 646 F.2d at 432.
201. 575 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1978).
202. Id at 1319-1320.
203. 646 F.2d at 432.
204. 628 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1980).
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with robbing a bank.20 5 While the Government initially proceeded on the
theory that the defendant was the principal of the robbery, the Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that, based on the evidence presented at trial, an aiding and
abetting instruction was properly submitted to the jury by the trial court.
206
The appellate court noted that the defense counsel was not misled as to the
nature of the charge. While the defense tried to create confusion as to the
identity of the actual robber, this confusion did not preclude the jury from




United States v. B/htsteh 208 involved the conviction of an attorney for wire
fraud on the basis of the attorney's discussion with a client concerning fees
and the status of the client's case. 20 9 When the client, DeYoung, an actor
working in Colorado, consented to a baggage check for weapons at Denver
Stapleton Airport, the security officer discovered and confiscated a small vial
containing a substance later identified as less than one gram of cocaine.
Upon his arrival in California, DeYoung contacted the defendant attorney,
Blitstein, concerning the possible legal consequences of the incident. Blit-
stein requested a retainer fee based upon the information that the confis-
cated substance had tested positive as cocaine, even though he had not yet
asked the police about the test results. 2 10 When DeYoung was subsequently
indecisive about paying Blitstein's large fee for the case, Blitstein notified
DeYoung that there was a warrant out for his arrest, and that upon his re-
turn to Colorado the police would drag him off in chains. 21 ' Blitstein fur-
ther stated in conversation with DeYoung that he must act quickly, in that
Blitstein would not be able to "control" the evidence once it was shipped to
Miami.2 '1 2 During this time, however, no warrant had been issued for De-
Young's arrest.
In holding that these facts supported a conviction for wire fraud, the
Tenth Circuit focused less on the technical elements of the statute than on
the generally unethical aspects of Blitstein's conduct. The appellate court
held that the high standards of moral conduct imposed on members of the
legal profession were violated by Blitstein's intimidation of his client for pre-
payment of the fee before any criminal charges had even been filed in the
case.
2 13
205. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (1976).
206. 628 F.2d at 1275.
207. d at 1276.
208. 626 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) prohibits the transmission of sounds by means of wire for the
purpose of making false representations. Blitstein was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(1976) for interstate travel with the intent to promote an illegal activity (extortion). 626 F.2d at
776.
210. 626 F.2d at 777.
211. Id. at 778.
212. Id
213. Id at 781.
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VI. TRIAL MATTERS
UntedSlates v. Winner2 14 involved the issue of whether the deputy attor-
ney general and the assistant attorney general of the United States could be
compelled to attend a post-conviction hearing, and if necessary, personally
invoke Governmental privileges concerning certain matters in that hearing.
This issue arose when the real party in interest (Feeney) filed a post-trial
motion for production seeking documentary information concerning certain
conversations he participated in during the course of his informant activi-
ties.215 Noting that Feeney had a constitutional right to exculpatory evi-
dence in mitigation of punishment, the trial judge granted access to tapes of
conversations with Government agents in which Feeney had participated
during the course of his informant activities.
2 16
After Feeney claimed that the produced documents were incomplete,
assistant attorney general Heymann was subpoenaed to appear at an eviden-
tiary hearing and to bring relevant documents concerning the taped conver-
sations. Heymann did not appear at the hearing; instead, two other
Department of Justice employees appeared, with instructions from deputy
attorney general Renfrew not to answer any questions pertaining to ongoing
investigations of the matter in which Feeney was used as an informer.
2 17
The trial judge ordered Renfrew to appear before the court and to invoke
the Government privilege in person, but indicated that Renfrew's testimony
could be given through an in camera hearing. The Government petitioned
for a writ of mandamus to vacate the order requiring the attendance of Ren-
frew and Heymann at the post-conviction hearing.
21 8
The Tenth Circuit, in considering the mandamus petition, recognized
that the deputy attorney general had not followed the recognized procedure
for invoking the law enforcement evidentiary privilege, which requires per-
sonal consideration of and objection to production of the requested informa-
tion. 21 9 Even so, the appellate court accepted a Government compromise,
with modifications, which did not require Renfrew's attendance at the hear-
ing. Under this compromise, Government representatives were to testify as
to the privileged information i'n camera. Any continued claims for privilege
were to be made by Renfrew after his personal review of the challenged
questions, and had to be supported in writing by his reasons for the contin-
ued claim of privilege.220 Concerning assistant attorney general Heymann's
attendance at the hearing, the appellate court held that attendance could be
214. 641 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1981).
215. Feeney was convicted of submitting materially false statements to federally insured
financial institutions for the purpose of influencing credit decisions in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1014, 2 (1976), wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2 (1976) and interstate transpor-
tation of fraudulent securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 12 (1976).
216. 641 F.2d at 828.
217. Id at 829.
218. Id at 830. In United States v. Feeney, 641 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1981), the Tenth Circuit
held that a third party who had intervened in United States v. Winner must risk contempt and
appeal from such citation in order to contest a subpoena duces tecum.
219. See Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Black
v. Sheraton Corp., 564 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
220. 641 F.2d at 833.
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required only after the trial court determines that Government representa-
tives' testimony shows a sufficient likelihood that Heymann's testimony is of
sufficient relevancy to require production.
22'
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Winner presents a reasonable resolution
of the conflict between Feeney's due process right to disclosure of exculpa-
tory material and the Government's law enforcement privilege for the pro-
tection of ongoing investigations. The opinion provides, however, a curious
review of a petition for writ of mandamus. 222 The appellate court held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion so as to justify issuance of a writ
of mandamus, yet it did overrule the district court's order mandating Hey-
mann's and Renfrew's attendance at the post-conviction hearing. The prac-
tical effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision was a reconsideration of the trial
court's exercise of discretion which the appellate court said was improper in
this instance.
United States v. Tager223 concerned disclosure of matters occurring before
a grand jury. In Tager, Mr. House, employed by the Insurance Crime Pre-
vention Institute (ICPI), developed sufficient evidence to refer the case to the
United States Postal Inspection Service. A grand jury was convened, and
Mr. House continued to assist the Government in the investigation. The
Government moved for, and was granted, an order for disclosure to Mr.
House of certain grand jury materials to enable him to further assist in the
investigation. On the grounds that this disclosure was illegal, the defendant
moved to dismiss the indictment presented against him.
224
The appellate court established that the legality of the disclosure must
be decided under rule 6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
This rule generally prohibits the disclosure of matters occurring before the
grand jury. Exception is made for disclosures to a Government attorney, by
court order in connection with a judicial proceeding, and to a criminal de-
fendant under certain conditions.
225
The Government sought to bring the disclosure to the admittedly non-
government investigator under the "judicial proceeding" exception. The
Government cited cases holding that the grand jury proceeding itself is a
judicial proceeding under the exception.226 The appellate court distin-
guished these cases as upholding disclosure either to Government personnel
or to a discharged grand jury. In holding that the disclosure in this instance
was improper, the court reasoned that to interpret a "judicial proceeding" as
221. As did the district court, the Tenth Circuit cited Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), for the proposition that all exculpatory material must be disclosed to both the accused
and his counsel. This rule is also incorporated in rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
222. A writ of mandamus is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976), and brought under rule
21 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, FED. R. App. P. 21. Under Supreme Court
Rule 30, the issuance of such a writ "is not a matter of right but of sound discretion sparingly
exercised."
223. 638 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1980).
224. Id at 168.
225. These exceptions are listed in FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A) 3(C).
226. United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979);
In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Tex. 1975); In re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154
(D.R.I. 1972); In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas, 370 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
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including an ongoing grand jury before which the challenged material was
being considered would effectively emasculate the intent of rule 6(e)(2).
Rather, disclosure in connection with a judicial proceeding must be for a
purpose other than assistance of the present grand jury proceedings.
227
Co/in Campbell
227. 638 F.2d at 170.
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